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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL BODIES IN
INFLUENCING U.S. POLICY TO END VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN
Lenora M. Lapidus*
INTRODUCTION
On June 27, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court in Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales,' held that police failure to enforce a domestic violence order of
* Lenora M. Lapidus is the Director of the American Civil Liberties Union Women's Rights
Project where she focuses on economic justice for low-income women of color, violence
against women, equal educational opportunities for women and girls, and women and girls in
the criminal and juvenile justice systems. In each of these areas, Ms. Lapidus incorporates a
human rights framework into her litigation and advocacy and has engaged in several
international human rights processes including advocacy before the United Nations Human
Rights Committee in its review of U.S. compliance with the ICCPR; the U.N. CERD
Committee; the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women; U.N. Special Rapporteurs on
Violence Against Women, Trafficking, Adequate Housing, and the Rights of Migrants; a
U.S. Social Forum Court of Women; a Domestic Workers Human Rights Tribunal; and is
currently counsel in Gonzales v. United States, a case pending before the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights.
I would like to thank Joshua David Riegel for his assistance in preparing this essay.
In addition, I would like to thank Jamil Dakwar, Steven Watt, and Chandra Bhatnagar, of the
ACLU Human Rights Program, for helping me understand the international human rights
systems and working with me to engage the various international bodies described herein;
Laleh Ispahani, Director of Transparency and Integrity Fund at the Open Society Institute
and formerly of the ACLU Racial Justice Program, for collaborating on several of these
advocacy efforts and reviewing a draft of this essay; Ann Beeson, Director of the U.S.
Program at the Open Society Institute and formerly the Associate Legal Director of the
ACLU, for establishing the ACLU Human Rights Program and directing it in its formative
years during which I had the opportunity to engage in many of the human rights mechanisms
described herein; and Steven R. Shapiro, the Legal Director of the ACLU, and Anthony D.
Romero, the Executive Director of the ACLU, for enabling me to participate in this
important work of engaging international human rights mechanisms in an effort to influence
U.S. policy and eradicate violence against women as part of my daily work. Further, I would
like to thank Catherine Powell, Professor and Director of the International Law and the
Constitution Initiative at Fordham Law School's Leitner Center on International Law and
Justice, for organizing the Symposium and inviting me to present on the panel, The Role of
International Bodies in Influencing U.S. Policy, and to submit this essay for publication.
Finally, and most importantly, I would like to thank Jessica Lenahan, formerly Gonzales, for
her courage, strength, and willingness to fight to ensure that police are held accountable if
they fail to protect adequately women and children from domestic violence. It has been
inspirational working with Jessica. Throughout this essay, I will refer to her as Jessica
Gonzales as that is how she is known in legal proceedings and international human rights
mechanisms.
1. 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
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protection as required by a state's mandatory arrest law did not violate the
Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution. In a 7-2 decision authored by
Justice Antonin Scalia, the Court found that, even though a court in
Colorado had issued a protective order to Jessica Gonzales based on a
finding that her ex-husband posed a threat to her and her children, and
notwithstanding Colorado's mandatory arrest law, which requires the police
to arrest or seek a warrant for the arrest of anyone who violates an order of
protection, Jessica Gonzales had no procedural due process right to police
enforcement of her protective order.
The facts of this case, the legislative history of Colorado's mandatory
arrest law, and the continuing widespread problem of lack of police
accountability for failing to protect women from domestic violence
demanded that the Supreme Court's dismissal of her case not be the final
word in Jessica Gonzales's quest for justice. Thus, in collaboration with the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Jessica Gonzales has pursued
claims against the United States through international and regional human
rights mechanisms. After a brief summary of the case, this essay will
discuss the advocacy efforts before those international bodies and the ways
in which these efforts have influenced U.S. policy.
I. PROCEEDINGS IN U.S. COURTS
A. Background Facts
Jessica Gonzales lived in Castle Rock, Colorado. In May 1999, she
obtained a domestic violence order of protection against her estranged
husband, Simon Gonzales. The order required him to stay away from her
and their three daughters, Leslie, who was seven, Katheryn, eight, and
Rebecca, ten. The protective order reiterated Colorado law, which
mandates that an "officer shall arrest, or... seek a warrant for the arrest" of
an individual when probable cause exists to believe that the individual has
violated a protective order.2 Colorado's law, like mandatory arrest laws
around the country, was adopted specifically to address the longstanding
problem of police failure to treat domestic violence seriously, and in order
to remove police discretion in such circumstances.
A few weeks after Jessica Gonzales had obtained the order, while the
children were playing outside of her house, Simon Gonzales kidnapped the
three girls. At about 5:30 p.m., Jessica Gonzales called the Castle Rock
Police Department to inform them that she believed her ex-husband had
taken the children in violation of her protective order and requested that the
police search for the children and bring them home. Over the next ten
hours, Jessica Gonzales repeatedly contacted the police, by phone and in
person, and begged them to enforce her protective order. Each time, the
police told her they could not do anything and that she should call them
2. COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-6-803.5(3) (Supp. 1993).
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back later if Simon Gonzales had not brought the children home. At 8:30
p.m., Jessica Gonzales reached her ex-husband on his cell phone and
learned that he had the three girls at an amusement park in Denver. Jessica
Gonzales immediately reported this information to the police and provided
them with a description of Simon Gonzales's truck. Still, the police refused
to act, this time saying that Denver was out of their jurisdiction. Finally, at
3:30 a.m., Simon Gonzales drove up to the police station and opened fire.
The police shot back and killed him. When they looked in the cab of his
truck, the police found the bodies of the three dead girls. The girls may
have been killed by Simon Gonzales with a gun that he purchased that day,
during the time that Jessica Gonzales had been pleading with the police to
enforce her order of protection. It is also possible that the girls were killed
by gun fire from the police barrage of bullets aimed at Simon Gonzales and
his truck. Certainly, their bodies were riddled with bullet wounds from
more than one gun. Because the Castle Rock Police Department has never
conducted a thorough investigation of the occurrences of June 22 and 23,
1999, Jessica Gonzales remains uncertain as to the exact time, place, and
manner of the deaths of her three daughters.
B. District Court and Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
In June 2000, Jessica Gonzales filed a lawsuit against the Castle Rock
Police Department alleging that the police failure to enforce her protective
order violated her substantive and procedural due process rights. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Colorado dismissed the action,3 relying on
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services.4 In
DeShaney, the Supreme Court held, in 1989, that the State had no
constitutional duty to protect Joshua DeShaney from abuse by his father,
even after receiving reports of such possible abuse, because an individual
has no substantive due process right to protection by the State from harm
committed by a private individual. 5
The district court, following the reasoning of DeShaney, dismissed
Jessica Gonzales's due process claims, holding that the Castle Rock Police
Department had no duty to protect her or her children from harm caused by
Simon Gonzales. 6 In its conclusion, the court repeated a quote from
DeShaney:
"Judges and lawyers, like other humans, are moved by natural sympathy
in a case like this to find a way for [the deceased children] and [their]
mother to receive adequate compensation for the grievous harm inflicted
upon them. But before yielding to that impulse, it is well to remember
3. See Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, No. Civ.A.00 D 1285, 2001 WL 35973820 (D.
Colo. Jan. 23, 2001).
4. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
5. See id. at 195.
6. See Gonzales, 2001 WL 35973820, at *5.
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once again that the harm was inflicted not by the [Defendants], but by
[Simon Gonzales]." '7
This human impulse and "natural sympathy," which U.S. constitutional law
rejects, is at the heart of the international human rights system, as this essay
will discuss later.8  The desired goal, however, is not for "adequate
compensation" because no monetary damages can bring back Jessica
Gonzales's three daughters. Rather, the goal is to stop such atrocities from
occurring again to some other mother who seeks police protection against
an abusive father. The goal is to obtain a public statement that the police
malfeasance in this case is actionable and that the Castle Rock Police
Department should be held accountable for its failure to protect Jessica
Gonzales and her three young daughters from the violence that occurred.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
district court's dismissal of Jessica Gonzales's substantive due process
claim but reversed with regard to her procedural due process claim.9 The
Tenth Circuit held that the mandatory arrest provisions of Colorado state
law gave Jessica Gonzales an entitlement to police enforcement of her
protective order, as a form of property right, and that the Constitution
prohibited the State from depriving her of this right without some fair
procedure. 10 The court held that the police were required, at a minimum, to
listen to Jessica Gonzales's request for enforcement of the protective order,
make inquiries to determine whether probable cause existed to believe that
the protective order had been violated, and inform Jessica Gonzales about
their intended response and whether they would seek to arrest Simon
Gonzales. 1' The court found that the Castle Rock Police Department did
none of these things, and thus Jessica Gonzales had stated a claim for
violation of her right to procedural due process. 12 The Town of Castle
Rock sought review by the full Tenth Circuit, which affirmed the panel's
decision en banc. 13
C. United States Supreme Court
The Town of Castle Rock sought certiorari by the Supreme Court. When
the Court granted certiorari, the ACLU Women's Rights Project got
involved. We coordinated the amicus effort, overseeing the production of
nine amicus briefs on behalf of approximately 150 organizations and
individuals, and wrote our own. 14 We also consulted with Jessica Gonzales
7. Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 202-03) (alterations in original).
8. See infra Part II.
9. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 307 F.3d 1258, 1266 (10th Cir. 2002).
10. See id. at 1264-66.
11. See id. at 1265.
12. See id. at 1266.
13. Gonzales v. City of Castle Rock, 366 F.3d 1093, 1118 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc).
14. Brief Amicus Curiae of the American Civil Liberties Union and ACLU of Colorado,
et al. Supporting Respondent, Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (No.
04-278), 2005 WL 328202; see also Brief Amici Curiae of National Network to End
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and her attorney in preparation for the Supreme Court briefing and
argument.
In June 2005, the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's en banc
decision, holding that Jessica Gonzales's due process rights had not been
violated because, despite Colorado's mandatory arrest law, Jessica
Gonzales had no personal entitlement to enforcement of her protective
order. In his majority opinion, Justice Scalia reasoned first, that although
Colorado law says the police "shall" arrest or seek a warrant for arrest,
"shall" does not mean shall, because it is used here, as in many statutes,
without obligating the government to take action; the "mandatory arrest"
law is not in fact mandatory; and police always retain discretion about how
best to carry out their functions. 15 Second, Justice Scalia asserted, even if
the law actually meant what it said, and required police to arrest or seek a
warrant for arrest when an order of protection is violated, that does not
mean the victim has a personal entitlement to police enforcement; rather the
police obligation is imposed to benefit society as a whole. 16 Finally, even if
the law were mandatory, and even if an individual had some personal
entitlement to police enforcement, this entitlement would not be the type of
interest that the Due Process Clause protects, because it provides no
monetary value to the holder of the order and provides her only an indirect
benefit. 17 Thus, the Court held, Jessica Gonzales had failed to state a claim
and her case should be dismissed. '8
The dissent, written by Justice John Paul Stevens and joined only by
Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, argued that the majority opinion ignored the
clear language of Colorado's mandatory arrest statute, as well as the
legislative history of this statute and others like it across the country, which
were enacted specifically to address the problem of police failure to treat
domestic violence as seriously as other crimes and to remove police
discretion with regard to enforcement. 19 Further, the dissent asserted, the
Domestic Violence et al. Supporting Respondent, Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278),
2005 WL 353608; Brief of National Coalition Against Domestic Violence et al. as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353985;
Brief of National Black Police Association et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent,
Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 328203; Brief of International Law Scholars
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005
WL 328200; Brief of Peggy Kerns, Former Member of the House of Representatives of
Colorado et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-
278), 2005 WL 353694; Brief Amicus Curiae of the National Association of Women
Lawyers et al. Supporting Respondent, Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL
328201; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Family Violence Prevention Fund et al. Supporting
Respondent, Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL 353693; Brief Amicus Curiae
of AARP in Support of Respondent, Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (No. 04-278), 2005 WL
353692. All amicus briefs are also available at http://www.aclu.org/scotus/2004/20919re
s2005021504278/20919res200502l5.html.
15. See Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 760-63.
16. See id. at 764-66.
17. See id. at 766-68.
18. See id. at 768-69.
19. See id. at 779-81 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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purpose of an order of protection is clearly to benefit the specific holder of
the order, whom a court has found faces a particular risk of harm from an
identified potential assailant, and not just to benefit society at large.20
Finally, the dissent pointed out that the Due Process Clause frequently has
been interpreted to protect other nontraditional property rights such as
welfare benefits, 21  disability benefits,22  public education,23  utility
services, 24 government employment,2 5 as well as other state conferred
entitlements, 26 and that police enforcement of a protective order as required
by Colorado's mandatory arrest law is no different. None of these other
recognized forms of "property" has a precise monetary value and each only
indirectly benefits the individual, just as an entitlement to police
enforcement of Jessica Gonzales's protective order provides in this
context. 27
The Supreme Court in Gonzales thus denied any constitutional remedy
for women who are harmed as a result of police failure to follow the law
and adequately protect them from domestic violence. 28  In most
20. See id. at 786-89.
21. See generally Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
22. See generally Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
23. See generally Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
24. See generally Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978).
25. See generally Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985).
26. See, e.g., Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982) (finding that due
process prohibits the arbitrary denial of a person's interest in adjudicating a claim before a
state commission); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (finding that due process requires
fair procedures before a driver's license can be revoked pending judgment on an accident
claim).
27. See Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 789-90 (2005) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
28. The Court had previously foreclosed any claims asserting a substantive due process
violation in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189,
195-201 (1989). Further, although federal courts have on occasion provided remedies to
victims of domestic violence under the Equal Protection Clause in cases where victims have
shown that police failure to protect the victim was the result of discriminatory intent, see
Thurman v. Torrington, 595 F. Supp. 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Fajardo v. Los Angeles, 179
F.3d 698 (9th Cir. 1999), such a claim is unlikely to prevail before the Supreme Court today.
To prevail on a claim of sex discrimination in violation of the Equal Protection Clause, a
litigant would have to demonstrate that a particular police response to domestic violence was
taken with the invidious intent to harm women-in other words, that a decision maker
"selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part 'because of,' not merely
'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon [women]." Pers. Adm'r of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S.
256, 279 (1979); see also Eagleston v. Guido, 41 F.3d 865, 878 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding that
victim of domestic violence could not prove equal protection violation where she failed to
demonstrate that discrimination against one sex was a motivating factor); Ricketts v. City of
Columbia, Mo., 36 F.3d 775, 781-82 (8th Cir. 1994) (concluding that a victim of domestic
violence had no equal protection claim because there was no evidence that male victims of
domestic abuse were treated differently than female victims of domestic abuse, and there
was no other admissible evidence of discriminatory intent). Because neither evidence of a
policy's adverse impact on women nor evidence of a decision maker's awareness of this
impact alone is sufficient to establish intentional discrimination, sex discrimination claims
challenging a police department's response to domestic violence have typically failed in the
absence of "smoking gun" evidence in the form of discriminatory statements by law
enforcement personnel. See Eckert v. Town of Silverthorne, 25 Fed. App'x 679 (10th Cir.
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circumstances, this ruling by the Supreme Court would be viewed as the
final step in challenging the police malfeasance. However, Jessica
Gonzales was not willing to simply go home and accept defeat. And
neither were her attorneys at the ACLU. Thus, we pursued international
human rights strategies to raise the visibility of this problem and to force
the United States to engage in a dialogue about violence against women and
police accountability.
II. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS MECHANISMS
Following the Supreme Court's decision in June 2005, Jessica Gonzales,
in collaboration with the ACLU, raised claims of human rights violations
before both universal and regional human rights bodies.
A. Universal System-United Nations
First, we pursued justice for Jessica Gonzales through the universal
system-the system that operates under the auspices of the United Nations
(U.N.). The universal system for the protection of human rights has two
dimensions: U.N. Charter-based bodies for the protection of human rights
and international treaty-based bodies for the protection of human rights.
The United Nations works "[t]o achieve international co-operation in
solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or
humanitarian character, and [to] promot[e] and encourag[e] respect for
human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to
race, sex, language, or religion." 29
1. United Nations Charter-Based Mechanisms
The U.N. Charter was signed in 1945, based on a post-World War II
desire to create an institution to promote security, fundamental human
rights, and peace. The Charter provides the operational structure and
purposes of the United Nations. In its preamble, the Charter highlights the
U.N.'s commitment to human rights and fundamental freedoms, specifically
to "reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of
the human person, [and] in the equal rights of men and women and of
nations large and small."'30
The foundational document of the United Nations and, indeed, of
international human rights around the globe, is the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR), which celebrates its sixtieth anniversary this year
on December 10, 2008. In the wake of the horrors of World War II, the
2001); Watson v. City of Kan. City, 857 F.2d 690, 694 (10th Cir. 1988); cf Balistreri v.
Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 1990) (finding police officer's statement
to a domestic violence survivor that he did not blame her husband for hitting her because of
the way she was carrying on was likely sufficient to support a claim of sex discrimination
under the Equal Protection Clause).
29. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 3.
30. U.N. Charter pmbl.
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Universal Declaration was created by a newly constituted Commission on
Human Rights to ensure that "never again" would the world see another
Holocaust. As the Commission's chairperson, Eleanor Roosevelt, making
manifest her long-demonstrated commitment to social justice, was
instrumental in guiding a group of eminent jurists in the creation of the
Universal Declaration and imparting it with its foundational balance of civil
and political rights with economic, social, and cultural rights. 31  The
preamble of the Universal Declaration states, in part,
whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of
freedom, justice and peace in the world, [and] [w]hereas disregard and
contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have
outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which
human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from
fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people .... [therefore this Declaration establishes a universal]
standard of achievement [to secure the] universal and effective
recognition and observance [of the rights set out herein], both among the
peoples of Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories
under their jurisdiction. 32
The U.N. Charter-based mechanisms include the U.N. General
Assembly, which is made up of all 191 (originally fifty-one) state party
members of the United Nations, including the United States, and the U.N.
Security Council, which consists of five permanent members (with veto
power) and ten rotating members based on regional diversity. The General
Assembly includes the Human Rights Council, formerly the Human Rights
Commission. The Human Rights Council was created by the U.N. General
Assembly on March 15, 2006, to replace the Human Rights Commission
that had been created by the Charter in 1946. The Council consists of forty-
seven member countries, which were elected on May 9, 2006. The Council
meets in Geneva, Switzerland, at least three times a year for a total period
of at least ten weeks.
The Human Rights Council maintains the Human Rights Commission's
former system of independent human rights experts, including special
rapporteurs, special representatives, independent experts, and other working
groups and mechanisms. These special rapporteurs/experts are generally
respected academics, activists, judges, or attorneys who examine, monitor,
advise, and publicly report on human rights abuses around the world. They
investigate and report on major human rights violations with regard to
specific substantive issues, known as thematic mandates, conduct country
31. See American Civil Liberties Union, Dignity Begins at Home: 60th Anniversary of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, http://www.udhr60.org (last visited Oct. 13,
2008). See generally CAROL ANDERSON, EYES OFF THE PRIZE: THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN STRUGGLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 1944-1955 (2003).
32. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), pmbl., U.N. Doc.
A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
[Vol. 77
2008] INTERNATIONAL BODIES & DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 537
visits to investigate and report on human rights abuses within particular
countries, and investigate and communicate with states parties about, and
report on, individual complaints.
One of these special experts is the United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women. The ACLU first met with the current Special
Rapporteur, Yakin Erturk, in March 2005 when we attended the session of
the United Nations Human Rights Commission in Geneva. At that time, we
discussed with her a range of issues related to violence against women in
the United States. In July 2006, while we were in Geneva for the United
Nations Human Rights Committee's review of U.S. compliance with the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),33 Jessica
Gonzales and I met with the Special Rapporteur's staff to present Jessica
Gonzales's individual case. The Special Rapporteur agreed to take up
Jessica Gonzales's case and to submit a confidential communication to the
United States inquiring about its response to the human rights violations
Jessica Gonzales had suffered.
In initiating this communication with the United States, the Special
Rapporteur on Violence Against Women acted in accordance with the
"Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women," adopted by
the Commission on Human Rights at its fourth session in 2005. 34 The
resolution "[e]ncourages the Special Rapporteur to respond effectively to
reliable information that comes before her" and requests all member states
"to cooperate with and assist the Special Rapporteur in the performance of
her mandated tasks and duties, to supply all information requested,
including with regard to implementation of her recommendations, and to
respond to the Special Rapporteur's visits and communications." 35
Notwithstanding this resolution, the United States refused to cooperate
with Erturk or to respond in any way to her confidential communication
about the human rights violations suffered by Jessica Gonzales. In
February 2007, during a session of the Commission on the Status of
Women at the United Nations in New York, the ACLU again met with the
Special Rapporteur. At that time she informed us that the United States had
failed to respond to her communication regarding Jessica Gonzales.
Although the United States refused to respond, the Special Rapporteur on
Violence Against Women reported on her communication regarding the
human rights violations suffered by Jessica Gonzales in her report to the
United Nations Human Rights Council on March 19, 2007.36 This report
33. See infra Part III.A.2.a.
34. U.N. Comm'n on Human Rights, Elimination of Violence Against Women,
E/CN.4/2005 (Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/E/CHR/resolutions
/E-CN_4-RES-2005-41.doc (adopting the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13).
35. Id.
36. Special Rapporteur, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women,
Its Causes and Consequences, delivered to the Human Rights Council, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/4/34/Add. 1 (Mar. 19, 2007) (on file with author) [hereinafter Report of the Special
Rapporteur].
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discussed eighty-three communications the Special Rapporteur had
transmitted to forty-four member states in 2006. In the section of her report
on the United States, the Special Rapporteur reported that she had sent an
allegation letter to the government on July 19, 2006. 37 She then recounted
Jessica Gonzales's allegations regarding the abuse by Simon Gonzales, the
Colorado court's issuance of a protective order, Simon Gonzales's
kidnapping of Leslie, Katheryn, and Rebecca Gonzales, the children's
deaths, the Castle Rock Police Department's refusal to enforce Jessica
Gonzales's protective order or arrest Simon Gonzales, and the Supreme
Court's denial of a remedy for this police malfeasance. 38 The Special
Rapporteur stated that she "regrets that the Government did not reply to her
communication sent on 19 July 2006 and would like to reiterate her interest
in receiving a reply from the Government in regard to the allegation
submitted."'39
The international human rights system is built on a shared willingness of
member states to cooperate with its mechanisms. If countries refuse to do
so, the human rights mechanisms-including Charter- and Treaty-based
bodies, and special rapporteurs-have no power to force a country to do
anything. However, reports on a country's compliance--or lack thereof-
with human rights norms shine a spotlight on human rights abuses and can
shame a country into altering its practices. Although the United States did
not respond to the Special Rapporteur's communication regarding the
human rights violations suffered by Jessica Gonzales, the process of telling
her story to this international human rights expert and having the expert
agree to take up her case and communicate with the United States about its
policies and practices with regard to police protection against domestic
violence, and specifically the failure of the Castle Rock Police Department
to respond adequately to her pleas for assistance on June 22 and 23, 1999,
gave Jessica Gonzales some sense of justice. This communication provided
her with an opportunity to push the United States to answer for its failures,
rather than having the issue simply end with the Supreme Court's ruling
dismissing her lawsuit.
2. Treaty-Based Bodies
In addition to presenting Jessica Gonzales's case to a United Nations
Charter-based body-the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against
Women-the ACLU has also raised the issue of violence against women,
including the abuses suffered by Jessica Gonzales, before two treaty-based
bodies: the United Nations Human Rights Committee, which oversees
compliance with the ICCPR, and the Committee to End Racial
Discrimination, which monitors compliance with the International
Convention to End All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD).
37. Id. 706.
38. Id. 707-09.
39. Id. 710.
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The United Nations is responsible for drafting human rights treaties and
for monitoring and ensuring states parties' compliance with those treaties.
All states parties that sign and ratify international treaties are obligated to
report periodically to the United Nations treaty-body committee that
monitors compliance with that treaty. The committee examines each state
party's report, reviews supplemental "shadow reports" submitted by
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and questions states parties on
their compliance with the treaty. Following this review, the committee
praises the states parties' areas of improvement, recommends ways in
which the states parties can further improve their compliance with the treaty
and observes areas that need improvement for the next reporting period.
The U.S. Constitution provides, in part, that "Treaties.. . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land."'40 Treaties must be signed by the President and
ratified by the Senate. 4 1 Once a treaty is ratified, it becomes federal law
and the Supremacy Clause attaches. This means that the government is
obligated to abide by it. However, there is no automatic right to sue the
government in court for violations of treaty provisions. 42 In other words,
treaties are not self-executing. In order for a private right of action to exist,
the government must enact laws mandating action to implement the treaty
provisions and specify that failure to comply with these laws provides
affected individuals an opportunity to sue the government. 43
a. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
One of the most important human rights treaties that the United States
has signed and ratified is the ICCPR.44 The United States signed the
ICCPR in 1977 and ratified it in 1992. This treaty mandates that
40. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
41. Id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. Alternatively, a treaty may be enacted through congressional-
executive power. See generally Oona A. Hathaway, Treaties' End: The Past, Present, and
Future of International Lawmaking in the United States, 117 YALE L.J. 1236 (2008); Harold
Hongju Koh, Congressional Controls on Presidential Trade Policymaking After I.N.S. v.
Chadha, (1986); Myers S. McDougal & Asher Lans, Treaties and Congressional-Executive
or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy: I, 54 YALE
L.J. 181 (1945).
42. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. 253, 314 (1829); Igartua-De La Rosa v. United States,
417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
43. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Foster, 27 U.S. at 314;
Igartua-de La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 150. See generally Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 198-204 (2d ed. 1996); Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing
Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760 (1988); Carlos Manuel Vdizquez, The Four Doctrines of
Self-Executing Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 697-700 (1995); Carlos Manuel V6.zquez,
Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 1082, 1101-10
(1992). Alternatively, if a treaty is enacted through congressional-executive power, it takes
the form of legislation, like any other law enacted by Congress, and thus is enforceable in
court, if so specified. See generally HENKIN, supra, at 204-06; Hathaway, supra note 41;
Paust, supra, at 775-81.
44. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 19,
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (signed by the United States in 1977 and
ratified in 1992).
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[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law
shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race,
color, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, property, birth or other status.4 5
The treaty also requires that "all persons deprived of their liberty shall be
treated with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the
human person."4 6 In addition, it prohibits slavery, servitude, and forced or
compulsory labor.4 7
Article 2 of the ICCPR provides for equal application of rights and
effective remedies for violations of those rights. 48 Article 3 guarantees
equal rights for men and women. 49 Under the ICCPR, governments have
obligations of both a negative and positive nature: "the obligation under the
Covenant is not confined to the respect of human rights, but states parties
have also undertaken to ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all
individuals under their jurisdiction. This aspect calls for specific activities
... to enable individuals to enjoy their rights."'50 Thus, in contrast to U.S.
constitutional law, the ICCPR requires the government not only to refrain
from interfering with individuals' rights, but also obligates the government
to take affirmative measures to ensure that individuals can exercise their
rights.
In October 2005, the United States submitted its second and third
combined periodic reports on compliance with the ICCPR to the United
Nations Human Rights Committee. 51 In response, the ACLU and several
other NGOs submitted shadow reports describing the various ways in which
the United States has failed to comply with the treaty. In the ACLU's
report entitled, Dimming the Beacon of Freedom: U.S. Violations of the
45. Id. art. 26.
46. Id. art. 10, § 1.
47. Id. art. 8, § 1.
48. Id. art. 2.
49. Id. art. 3.
50. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 03: Implementation at the
National Level (Art. 2) (July 27, 1981), available at http://193.194.138.190/tbs/
doc.nsf/(Symbol)/c95edl e8efl 14cbec 12563ed00467eb5?Opendocument (emphasis added).
51. See generally United States of America, Consideration of Reports Submitted by
States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, delivered to the Human Rights Committee,
U.N. Doc. CCPRC/IUSA/3 (Nov. 28, 2005) [hereinafter U.S. Report]. Under the ICCPR,
states parties are obligated to submit a report on compliance within one year of entry into
force and periodic reports on compliance every five years thereafter. ICCPR, supra note 44,
art. 40(1)(a); Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Introduction to the
Human Rights Committee, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu2/6/a/introhrc.htm (last visited
Oct. 13, 2008). The United States missed its first deadline and submitted a combined second
and third periodic report almost seven years after it was due. Thus, the Human Rights
Committee's review was only the second time that the United States had been reviewed for
compliance with the ICCPR since it ratified the treaty in 1992.
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,52 we discussed, inter
alia, the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales, as an example of the way
in which the United States has imperiled both the equal application of rights
and the availability of effective (or in some cases, any) remedies, in
violation of Article 2 of the ICCPR. 53 Gonzales is one of many cases
decided by the Supreme Court in recent years that has sharply limited the
ability of individuals to sue for civil rights violations. 54 Rights available to
women who have been the victims of violence specifically have been
curtailed in Gonzales as well as in United States v. Morrison,55 in which the
Court struck down the civil rights remedy of the Violence Against Women
Act (VAWA). 56
The United States, in its report to the Human Rights Committee on
compliance with the ICCPR, failed to address this "roll back" of judicial
remedies, saying simply that "U.S. law provides extensive remedies and
avenues for seeking compensation and redress for alleged discrimination
and denial of constitutional and related statutory rights," citing those
"previously reported" and, additionally, the Violent Crime Control and Law
Enforcement Act of 1994, for "violations committed by law enforcement
officers." 57 Both Morrison and Gonzales erode federal civil rights remedies
for victims of gender-based violence. In Morrison, the Supreme Court held
that Congress did not have the power to create a private cause of action
through which a survivor of violence could sue her abuser for violations of
VAWA, 58 and in Gonzales, the Court held that a domestic violence victim
has no constitutional right to police enforcement of her order of
52. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, DIMMING THE BEACON OF FREEDOM: U.S. VIOLATIONS
OF THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS 25 (2006) [hereinafter
DIMMING THE BEACON OF FREEDOM], available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/iccprreport
20060620.pdf.
53. See e.g., Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
54. See generally Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2162 (2007)
(rejecting the claim that a discriminatory salary decision has continuing effect and can
therefore be challenged within 180 days of any paycheck that perpetuates the initial act of
discrimination); Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137 (2002) (holding
that an undocumented immigrant could not sue for back pay); Alexander v. Sandoval, 532
U.S. 275 (2001) (holding that there is no private right of action for individuals to bring
disparate impact claims pursuant to Title VI); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000) (holding that Congress did not have the power to create a private cause of action for a
woman to sue for violations of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA)); DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (holding that an individual
cannot bring a claim alleging a violation of a substantive due process right to protection by
the state from harm committed by a private individual); DENISE C. MORGAN ET AL.,
AWAKENING FROM THE DREAM: CIVIL RIGHTS UNDER SIEGE AND THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR
EQUAL JUSTICE (2006).
55. 529 U.S. 598.
56. Id. at 627.
57. U.S. Report, supra note 51, 59. The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement
Act of 1994, however, addresses violence and abuses committed directly by law enforcement
and is silent with regard to police failure to take action to prevent harm to individuals
committed by other private parties. 42 U.S.C.A. § 14141 (2004).
58. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598.
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protection. 59  In striking down the civil rights remedy in Morrison,
notwithstanding Congress's extensive findings supporting this remedy, and
in holding that the government has no affirmative duty to protect its citizens
from privately inflicted violence despite the existence of (1) a valid
protective order, (2) a state law mandating arrest of anyone who violates a
protective order, (3) knowledge of imminent harm, and (4) opportunity to
act to prevent the harm in Gonzales, the Court eliminated any federal civil
judicial remedy to compensate women for violence inflicted upon them by
private actors. 60 As a result, the only civil legal recourse for individual
victims of gender-based violence under U.S. law is through state courts,
which often minimize the importance of violence against women and
generally provide state officials with immunity from suit for failing to
protect women from private violence. 61 Accordingly, for women in most
states in America there is now no federal or state remedy available to take
action directly against the perpetrator of gender-based violence or to redress
police failure to respond to domestic violence. 62 Morrison and Gonzales,
therefore, undermine the ability and intent of Congress and state legislatures
to protect women from violence and to address this country's long history
59. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005).
60. See supra note 28.
61. Section 24-10-108 of the Colorado Governmental Immunity Act (CGIA), for
example, states that "[e]xcept as provided in sections 24-10-104 to 24-10-106, sovereign
immunity shall be a bar to any action against a public entity for injury which lies in tort or
could lie in tort regardless of whether that may be the type of action or the form of relief
chosen by a claimant." COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-10-108 (2007). Moreover, any state law
claims against individual police officers under Colorado state law are precluded because the
CGIA also provides immunity for agents of the state. Id. § 24-10-118. In addition to the
immunity bar, doctrinal hurdles in Colorado tort law, as in other states, render recovery
extraordinarily difficult in domestic violence cases. To take one example, the causation
requirement under Colorado tort law is such that even if a state actor has acted wrongly, no
liability attaches unless the plaintiff shows that the injury suffered could have been
reasonably foreseen by the state actor. See, e.g., Smith v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 749 P.2d
462, 464 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987). To the extent doctrinal hurdles such as the causation
requirement under tort law prevent a remedy from being granted where state actors fail to
take reasonable measures to protect and ensure rights, tort law, in most states, is not an
effective remedy.
62. There are a few exceptions, however, where state courts have held law enforcement
accountable when police fail to enforce a domestic violence order of protection. See Moore
v. Green, 848 N.E.2d 1015 (Ill. 2006) (holding that partial immunity under a domestic
violence statute, rather than full immunity under a tort immunity act, was applicable in a
wrongful death suit where a woman was murdered by her abuser after police failed to
enforce her order of protection); Massee v. Thompson, 90 P.3d 394 (Mont. 2004) (holding a
county sheriff liable for his failure to protect a victim of domestic violence); Campbell v.
Campbell, 682 A.2d 272 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding that police officers were
subject to liability when they failed to make an arrest for violation of a restraining order in
the face of a state law mandating such arrest); Nearing v. Weaver, 670 P.2d 137 (Or. 1983)
(holding that in light of Oregon's mandatory arrest law, police officers who knowingly failed
to arrest an individual violating a protective order were potentially liable for any injury to the
beneficiaries of the protective order resulting from their failure); Matthews v. Pickett
County, 996 S.W.2d 162 (Tenn. 1999) (holding that when an individual obtained an order of
protection and contacted the police to enforce that order against her abuser, the police had a
special duty to her under Tennessee law and could be held liable for breach of that duty).
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of nonresponsiveness by police and government officials to violence against
women. The decisions thus display a stubborn blindness to the realities of
violence against women and the legal protections enacted to respond to it.
In the ACLU's shadow report on U.S. compliance with the ICCPR,
Dimming the Beacon of Freedom, we discussed the Supreme Court's
decisions in Morrison and Gonzales as examples of America's failure to
make available effective federal judicial remedies for violations of the equal
application of rights under Article 2 of the ICCPR.63 In addition, we
discussed the ways in which many states, including Colorado, where Jessica
Gonzales lived, fail to provide remedies for victims of domestic violence
who are harmed as a result of police malfeasance because sovereign
immunity laws sharply limit the availability of any tort remedy, thereby
shielding government officials from liability with certain limited
exceptions. 64
Dimming the Beacon of Freedom also discussed the Gonzales case as an
example of the United States' violations of Article 3 of the ICCPR, which
requires equal rights for men and women.65 Under this Article, states
parties have an affirmative obligation to "take all steps necessary" in the
"public and private" sectors to eliminate practices that "impair the equal
enjoyment of rights." 66 Domestic violence is a widespread problem in the
United States, and throughout the world 67 that disproportionately impacts
women and impairs their equal enjoyment of rights. Thus, under the
ICCPR, governments have an affirmative obligation to take all steps
necessary, in the public and private sectors, to eliminate domestic violence.
The United States' failure to take such steps, and specifically the refusal of
the Castle Rock Police Department to enforce Jessica Gonzales's order of
protection and the U.S. courts' denial of a remedy for this police
malfeasance, constitute violations of Article 3 of the ICCPR.
In July 2006, the United States appeared before the Human Rights
Committee in Geneva, Switzerland, as part of the periodic review process
for its compliance with the ICCPR. The ACLU, along with representatives
from numerous other NGOs, sent a delegation to Geneva to observe and
participate in the review process. The ACLU delegation included staff from
the national office, staff from ACLU state affiliates, and ACLU clients.
Jessica Gonzales was one of three clients who joined ACLU staff in Geneva
as part of that delegation.
63. DIMMING THE BEACON OF FREEDOM, supra note 52, at 25-26.
64. Id.
65. Id.; ICCPR, supra note 44, art. 3.
66. U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 28: Equality of Rights Between
Men and Women (article 3) (Mar. 29, 2000), available at http://193.194.138.
190.tbs.doc.nsf/(Symbol)/13b02776122d4838802568b900360e80?Opendocument.
67. See generally THE SECRETARY-GENERAL, ENDING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
FROM WORDS TO ACTION, U.N. Sales No. E.06.IV.8 (2006); The Secretary-General, In-
Depth Study on All Forms of Violence Against Women, delivered to the General Assembly,
U.N. Doc. A/61/122/Add.1 (July 6, 2006) (on file with author).
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Although the United States acted insouciantly with regard to its
obligations under the ICCPR by failing to submit a compliance report when
due for its second review, and by submitting its 2005 report as a combined
second and third periodic report almost seven years late, once it had
submitted its report, the United States participated in the review process in
an engaged and serious manner. The United States sent a high-level
delegation to Geneva for the review, consisting of several government
officials including Matthew Waxman, Principal Deputy Director of Policy
Planning for the Department of State, and Wan Kim, Assistant Attorney
General and head of the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice.
The United States appeared before the Committee for questioning on two
full days, July 17 and 18, 2006. In addition, the United States submitted a
supplemental report responding to the Committee's list of issues.68
The ACLU and other NGOs spent a week in Geneva briefing Committee
members, engaging in internal strategy sessions, and holding public
education events for Committee members, the general public, and the press.
One of those events was a Victims' Testimony Panel, hosted by the ACLU
and the U.S. Human Rights Network. Jessica Gonzales testified on this
panel about the human rights violations she had suffered as a result of the
Castle Rock Police Department's failure to enforce her domestic violence
order of protection and the Supreme Court's refusal to provide a remedy for
this police malfeasance. The panel was well-received and provided Jessica
Gonzales her first opportunity to testify publicly in an international forum
about the events surrounding the kidnapping and murder of her three
daughters. Because her federal lawsuit had been dismissed on a motion to
dismiss, Jessica Gonzales never had an opportunity to testify or present
evidence about her tragedy to any tribunal and thus had been denied her
"day in court." It was only through this international human rights
mechanism-the United Nations Human Rights Committee review of U.S.
compliance with the ICCPR-that Jessica Gonzales finally obtained that
which she had been denied by the United States court system and
something that she desperately wanted: the opportunity to testify publicly
68. The list of issues included ten specific items that the Committee asked the United
States to be ready to respond to during the review process. These issues were drawn from
items discussed in the United States' compliance report and were recommended for in-depth
probing by nongovernmental organizations engaged in the process. The ten issues were: (1)
right to self-determination and rights of persons belonging to minorities; (2) constitutional
and legal framework within which the Covenant is implemented; (3) counterterrorism
measures and respect of Covenant guarantees; (4) nondiscrimination and right of equality
before the law and to the equal protection of the law; (5) right to life; (6) prohibition of
torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment; (7) treatment of persons
deprived of liberty; (8) freedom of association; (9) protection of children; and (10) right to
take part in the conduct of public affairs, to vote and to be elected, and to have access to
public service. U.N. Human Rights Comm., List of Issues to Be Taken Up in Connection
with the Consideration of the Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States of
America, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/Q/3 (Apr. 26, 2006). See generally U.S. Written
Response to List of Issues to Be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the
Second and Third Periodic Reports of the United States of America, available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/AdvanceDocs/USA-writtenreplies.pdf.
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about the failings of the Castle Rock Police Department that led to the
deaths of her three young daughters. This opportunity to tell her story
before an international body was tremendously gratifying and rewarding. It
also forced the United States to answer for its failures and thereby added
pressure on the government to alter its policies with regard to ending
violence against women.
b. International Convention on the Elimination ofAll Forms of Racial
Discrimination
In addition to raising Jessica Gonzales's plight as a human rights
violation under the ICCPR, the ACLU also raised these abuses as violations
of CERD.6 9 CERD prohibits discrimination on the basis of race and
specifically requires states parties to report on their records with regard to
the intersection of race and gender. 70 The United States signed CERD in
1966 and ratified it in 1994. In May 2007, the United States submitted its
fourth, fifth and sixth periodic reports in a single document. 71 In response,
the ACLU and several other NGOs submitted shadow reports. The
ACLU's report entitled, Race and Ethnicity in America, Turning a Blind
Eye to Injustice: U.S. Violations of the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination,72 discussed numerous ways in which
discrimination against people of color in the United States persists, in
violation of CERD.
Violence against minority women was one issue included in the ACLU's
shadow report. As noted in Race and Ethnicity, the United States' report to
the CERD committee was silent as to violence against women,
notwithstanding the fact that racial minority women in the United States are
especially vulnerable to violence. In our report we noted that "[p]olice
response to reports of domestic violence is frequently inadequate, exposing
racial minority women in particular to persistent and grave danger. '73 We
noted that additional factors in the government's failure to protect women
are the interpretation of the U.S. constitutional guarantee to protection from
violence as a "negative" right rather than a "positive" right, and the
69. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
G.A. Res. 2106 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/6014 (Dec. 21, 1965) [hereinafter CERD].
70. Id.; U.N. Human Rights Comm., General Recommendation No. 25: Gender Related
Dimensions of Racial Discrimination, 4, U.N. Doc. No. A/55/18, annex V (Mar. 20, 2000),
available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/76a293e49a88bd23802568b
d00538d83?Opendocument.
71. United States of America, Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the
Convention: Sixth Periodic Reports of States Parties Due in 2005, delivered to the
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/USA/6 (May 1,
2007) [hereinafter Periodic CERD Report], available at http://www2.ohchr.org/
english/bodies/cerd/docs/AdvanceVersion/cerd c_usa6.doc.
72. AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, RACE & ETHNICITY IN AMERICA: TURNING A BLIND EYE
TO INJUSTICE (2007) [hereinafter RACE AND ETHNICITY], available at
http://www.aclu.org/intlhumanrights/racialjustice/3306l pub200712 1 0.html.
73. Id. at 115.
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government's denial of its obligation to protect women from harm by
private parties, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Gonzales.74
On February 21 and 22, 2008, the CERD committee reviewed, U.S.
compliance with CERD at meetings held in Geneva.75 As it had during the
review of compliance with the ICCPR, the United States again sent a high-
level delegation to Geneva for this review process, including, among others,
Grace Chung Becker, Acting Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights.
As we had done during the Human Rights Committee's review of U.S.
compliance with the ICCPR, numerous U.S.-based NGOs went to Geneva
to advocate before the Committee, observe the review process, engage in
dialogue with the U.S. delegation, and conduct public education to highlight
the government's failure to eradicate racial discrimination in the United
States. Approximately 125 advocates from U.S.-based NGOs traveled to
Geneva for a week in February 2008. Among the many issues we
addressed were violence against women and police accountability.
In its concluding observations, the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination noted as a "Positive Aspect" the 2005 reauthorization
of VAWA. 76 However, the Committee also listed concerns and
recommendations with regard to violence against women:
While welcoming the various measures adopted by the State party to
prevent and punish violence and abuse against women belonging to racial,
ethnic and national minorities, the Committee remains deeply concerned
about the incidence of rape and sexual violence experienced by women
belonging to such groups .... The Committee also notes with concern
that the alleged insufficient will of federal and state authorities to take
action with regard to such violence and abuse often deprives victims
belonging to racial, ethnic and national minorities . . . of their right to
access to justice and the right to obtain adequate reparation or satisfaction
for damages suffered.77
The Committee recommended that the United States "increase its efforts to
prevent and punish violence and abuse against women belonging to racial,
ethnic and national minorities [by,] inter alia, .. . providing specific
training for those working within the criminal justice system, including
police officers ... prosecutors and judges." 78 Furthermore, the Committee
requested that the United States "include information on the results of these
measures and on the number of victims, perpetrators, convictions, and the
types of sanctions imposed, in its next periodic report."'79
74. Id.
75. Periodic CERD Report, supra note 71.
76. Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Concluding Observations of
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, at 2, U.N. Doc.
CERD/CIUSA/Co/6 (Feb. 2008) [hereinafter CERD Concluding Observations], available at
http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/CERDConcludingComments2008.pdf.
77. Id. at 8 (citing CERD, supra note 69, arts. 5(b), 6).
78. Id.
79. Id.
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The tragedy suffered by Jessica Gonzales poignantly illustrates the
ongoing problem of the failure of police to protect women in the United
States, particularly women of color, from intimate partner violence, in
violation of CERD. The fact that the Committee commented on this
violation in its concluding observations marked another victory in gaining
international recognition of the widespread problem of domestic violence in
the United States and of the government's failure to address adequately this
problem.
B. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
In addition to pursuing justice for Jessica Gonzales through the universal
human rights system-the United Nations charter-based and treaty-based
bodies and mechanisms-the ACLU also brought Jessica Gonzales's case
to the regional system for human rights in the Americas. Regional human
rights systems have been created in Europe,80 Africa, 8 1 and the Americas. 8
2
The inter-American human rights system operates under the auspices of the
Organization of American States (OAS), which was established in 1948.
Like the universal system under the United Nations, the regional system
promotes and protects human rights through the promulgation of
substantive norms, the operation of supervisory mechanisms, and the use of
individual petition procedures. The inter-American system consists of and
has jurisdiction over all countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the
United States, which is a member of the OAS.
The inter-American human rights system functions through two primary
bodies: the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR),
80. The European Court of Human Rights has jurisdiction over states parties that, as
signatories to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, belong to the Council of Europe. See generally Council of Europe, Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended by Protocol
No. 11 pmbl., Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222, available at
http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/Treaties/html/005.htm.
81. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Court on
Human and Peoples' Rights govern states parties that are signatories to the African Charter
on Human and Peoples' Rights and are members of the African Union, formerly called the
Organization of African Unity. See generally African Charter on Human and Peoples'
Rights, adopted June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58, 60 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986);
Organization of African Unity (OAU), Protocol to the African Charter on Human and
Peoples' Rights on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights,
OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/EXP/AFCHPR/PROT(III) (June 9, 1998) (entered into force Jan. 25,
2004), available at http://www.africa-union.org/rule-prot/africancourt-humanrights.pdf
82. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has jurisdiction over
all countries in the Western Hemisphere. See generally Organization of American States
[OAS], American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978); International Conference of American
States, American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OEA/ser.L./V./II.23, doc. 21
rev. 6 (1948) [hereinafter American Declaration]; Charter of the Organization of American
States, Apr. 30, 1948, 119 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Dec. 13, 1951); Statute of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights [IACHR], O.A.S. Res. 447 (IX-0/79) (1979). The
IACHR governs countries in the Western Hemisphere that are signatories to the American
Convention on Human Rights.
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which sits in Washington, D.C., and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, which sits in Costa Rica. These regional mechanisms are
comparable to human rights systems elsewhere in the world including the
European Court of Human Rights, the African Commission on Human and
People's Rights, and the African Court on Human and People's Rights.
As a result of having signed the Charter of the Organization of American
States, all members of the OAS, including the United States, are subject to
the procedures and recommendations of the IACHR. In addition, all states
parties that are signatories to the OAS Charter are governed by the
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 83 which is the
regional equivalent of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.84 The
Inter-American Court of Human Rights interprets and applies the American
Convention on Human Rights,85 which protects rights almost identical to
those protected by the ICCPR. Because the United States has not ratified
the American Convention, it is not subject to the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights' jurisdiction.86
The IACHR was established under the OAS charter and is responsible for
the protection and promotion of human rights in the Americas. The
Commission monitors and enforces states parties' compliance with the OAS
charter, the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, and the
American Convention on Human Rights. The Commission is comprised of
seven jurists from the OAS and is appointed by the OAS General
Assembly. The Commission hears individual petitions, holds general
hearings on thematic human rights violations, investigates abuses, and
issues country and thematic reports on a range of human rights violations. 87
Under the individual petition procedures, anyone in the Americas can file
a petition alleging one or more human rights violations by an OAS member
state. A petition must be filed within six months of exhausting domestic
remedies, unless pursuit of such remedies would be futile. 88  The
Commission also holds general hearings on thematic issues, which
individuals or groups may request through general petitions alleging
83. See American Declaration, supra note 82.
84. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 32, at 71.
85. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 82. See generally Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.cfm?&CFID=427625
&CFTOKEN=49297991 (last visited Oct. 17, 2008).
86. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 82.
87. Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR), What is the IACHR?,
http://www.cidh.org/what.htm (last visited Oct. 14, 2008). The IACHR also has special
rapporteurs with functions similar to those of the U.N. special rapporteurs. One regional
special rapporteur is the Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Women, who investigates
issues of violence against women as well as other issues of concern to women. The Special
Rapporteur and the OAS as a whole, have issued reports on various issues including violence
against women in the Americas. See generally OAS, Access to Justice for Women Victims of
Violence in the Americas, OEA/Ser.L/VI1 doc. 68 (Jan. 20, 2007), available at
http://www.cidh.org/women/Access07/Report%20Access%20to%20Justice%20Report%20E
nglish%20020507.pdf.
88. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 82, art. 46.
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widespread human rights violations not limited to a specific individual or
event. Although the Commission cannot issue binding judgments, it can
issue findings and observations setting out its conclusions with regard to
particular issues or petitioners, suggestions for changes in practices, and
recommendations to states parties with regard to future actions. Thus, the
Commission can provide something akin to declaratory relief, attention to
an issue, and international shaming.
In December 2005, just six months after the Supreme Court issued its
decision finding that the police failure to enforce her domestic violence
order of protection did not violate the Constitution and dismissing her case,
the ACLU filed a petition on behalf of Jessica Gonzales before the
IACHR. 89 The petition alleged that the police's failure to enforce her order
of protection, Castle Rock's failure to conduct a full investigation into the
deaths of her three children, and the U.S. courts' failure to provide a remedy
for this police malfeasance constituted violations of the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 90
Two of the most significant differences between the American
Declaration, like other international human rights law, and the U.S.
Constitution are: first, that a state party has an affirmative obligation to
provide protection from harm and is not merely precluded from causing
harm or interfering with a woman's safety (a "negative right"); and second,
that the state party must act with due diligence to protect individuals from
harm caused by third parties, not simply ensure that no harm is committed
by the government itself. These two basic premises of international human
rights law provide far greater protection for victims of domestic or gender-
based violence than does U.S. law, as it has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court in Gonzales,9 1 Morrison,92 DeShaney,9 3 and other cases.
89. Jessica Gonzales is currently represented before the IACHR by the ACLU and the
Columbia Law School Human Rights Clinic. See Caroline Bettinger-L6pez, Jessica
Gonzales v. United States: An Emerging Model for Domestic Violence & Human Rights
Advocacy in the United States, 21 HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 183 (2008).
90. See generally Petition Alleging Violations of the Human Rights of Jessica Gonzales
by the United States of America and the State of Colorado, with Request for an Investigation
and Hearing on the Merits, Petition No. P-1490-05, Gonzales v. United States, Inter-Am.
C.H.R. (2005) [hereinafter Gonzales Petition], available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/
petitionallegingviolationsofthehumanrightsofjessicagonzales.pdf, Observations Concerning
the Sept. 22, 2006 Response of the United States Government, Petition No. P-1490-05,
Gonzales v. United States, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (Dec. 11, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/gonzales-finalbrief.pdf; American Civil Liberties Union, Jessica
Gonzales v. USA, http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/gonzalesvusa.html (last
visited Oct. 17, 2008).
91. 545 U.S. 748 (2005) (finding that police failure to enforce a domestic violence order
of protection notwithstanding state's mandatory arrest law did not violate the Due Process
Clause).
92. 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (finding that Congress did not have authority to provide federal
civil remedy to victims of gender-motivated violence).
93. 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (finding that child had no substantive due process right to
protection by the state from harm committed by his father).
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In the ACLU's petition to the IACHR, we argued that the police failure
to investigate Jessica Gonzales's complaint, enforce her order of protection,
and arrest or seek a warrant to arrest Simon Gonzales violated her rights
and the rights of her daughters as guaranteed by the American Declaration
of the Rights and Duties of Man to life and personal security, to equality, to
protection against attacks on private and family life, to establish a family
and receive protection therefore, to the inviolability of the home, to special
protections for women and children, to investigation and dissemination of
ideas, and to petition the government. 94 Further, we argued that the failure
of U.S. courts to provide a legal remedy for these violations infringed
Jessica Gonzales's and her children's rights to life and personal security, to
equality, to special protection for women and children, to judicial recourse,
and to petition the government. The relief sought in the petition includes
legislative reform efforts at the state level to ensure that the terms of
domestic violence orders of protection are properly and effectively enforced
in accordance with the law; the provision of civil remedies for victims who
fail to receive such protection; a thorough investigation into the events of
June 22 and 23, 1999, that resulted in the deaths of Jessica Gonzales's three
daughters; funding for and proper oversight of prevention and support
services for victims of domestic violence; and .the creation of programs for
law enforcement officers aimed at sensitizing police officers to the
complexities of domestic violence and its effects on victims and training
them to respond in a gender-sensitive manner. 95
After seeking several extensions, the United States responded to Jessica
Gonzales's petition in December 2006, approximately one year after it was
filed.96 The United States argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction
to consider the petition. 97 The government asserted that the American
Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man is a nonbinding instrument,
that its provisions are aspirational only, and that it imposes no affirmative
obligations on states parties to prevent violence committed by private
actors. 98 However, the United States then went on to engage the arguments
and dispute the facts raised in the petition. Indeed, the United States
submitted an extremely lengthy written response. 99 In its response, the
United States attempted to prove that the government treats domestic
violence as seriously as it treats other crimes.100 In disputing the facts of
the night the Gonzales children were kidnapped and murdered and by
94. American Declaration, supra note 82, ch. 1, arts. I-II, V-VI, IX, VII, IV, XXIV.
95. Gonzales Petition, supra note 90, at 85-86.
96. Response of the Government of the United States of America to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights Regarding Jessica Gonzales, Petition No. P-1490-05,
Gonzales v. United States, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (2006) [hereinafter U.S Response to IACHR
Petition], available at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/womensrights/gonzales-govtresponse
20060925.pdf.
97. See id. at 25-39.
98. Id. at 26.
99. See generally id.
100. Id. at 13-25, 39.
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arguing that the United States provides extensive funding for domestic
violence services, the government demonstrated its acceptance, at least to
some degree, of these proceedings and ultimately to the Commission's
findings and recommendations.
On March 2, 2007, the IACHR held a hearing on Jessica Gonzales's
petition. This hearing was historic because it was the first time that the
Commission had held an individual hearing on a petition alleging human
rights violations against the United States for policies and practices related
to domestic violence. It was also significant because it was the first time in
the seven years that Jessica Gonzales had been pursuing justice through
legal channels that she was provided an opportunity to testify in a legal
proceeding before a full tribunal and finally have her "day in court." The
commissioners permitted Jessica Gonzales to testify for fifteen minutes and
to tell her story in her own words. 101 This opportunity, in itself, was far
more than she had been able to obtain through the U.S. court system;
because her federal lawsuit had been dismissed in the district court on a
motion to dismiss before any trial or court hearing, Jessica Gonzales had
never had the opportunity to present evidence or testify in a U.S. court of
law about the human rights violations she had suffered.
Although the United States disputed the jurisdiction of the Commission
to hear the petition, it engaged fully in the process. The government sent
high-level representatives-including Sarah Hankins, Alternate
Representative to the OAS for the U.S. Department of State, Kevin Baumer
and Bob Harris from the Office of the Legal Advisor for the U.S.
Department of State, Jennifer Kaplan from the U.S. Department of Justice,
and other representatives from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S.
Department of Justice--to argue its case and presented lengthy arguments
on numerous points. The United States disputed the facts of the night
Jessica Gonzales's children were kidnapped and killed, and attempted to
demonstrate various ways in which the government provides services to
combat domestic violence.102
Following the hearing, both Jessica Gonzales and the United States
submitted further observations in response to questions raised by the
commissioners. In particular, we argued that Jessica Gonzales had
exhausted all available, adequate, and effective domestic remedies available
to her and that her petition should therefore be deemed admissible. 10 3 We
also argued that the Castle Rock Police Department knew or should have
known the risk that Simon Gonzales presented to Jessica Gonzales and her
101. See generally American Civil Liberties Union, Jessica Gonzales v. USA,
http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/gonzalesvusa.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2008)
(providing a link to the full video transcript of the hearing before the Commission, as well as
other items related to this case).
102. See id. (video transcript of hearing, recorded Mar. 2, 2007). See generally U.S.
Response to IACHR Petition, supra note 96.
103. See Observations Concerning the March 2, 2007 Hearing Before the Commission,
Pet. No. 1490-05, Gonzales v. United States, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at 1-12 (May 14, 2007),
available at http://www.aclu.org/womensrights/violence/29760lgl20070514.html.
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
three daughters, and thus should have enforced her order of protection.104
Further, we argued that, contrary to the assertion of the United States that
Simon Gonzales's actions were aberrational; Jessica Gonzales's experience
demonstrated the prevalence of domestic violence in Colorado and
throughout the United States, as well as the lack of police responsiveness
and accountability with regard to protecting women from such violence.105
Finally, we argued that a Commission finding in favor of Jessica Gonzales
would in no way open the "floodgates" to petitions alleging state failure to
prevent criminal activity, contrary to the United States' contention.10 6
In July 2007, the Commission declared in a landmark "admissibility"
decision that Jessica Gonzales's case could proceed, rejecting the United
States' position that the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man does not create positive governmental obligations. 10 7 Instead, the
decision holds the United States to international standards of state
responsibility to exercise "due diligence" to prevent, investigate, and punish
human rights violations and protect and compensate victims of domestic
violence.108 In its admissibility decision, the IACHR also found that
Jessica Gonzales had exhausted all domestic legal avenues available to
her. 109 In light of the Commission's favorable admissibility decision
allowing her case to proceed, on March 24, 2008, Jessica Gonzales
submitted additional briefing on the legal merits of her allegations. On
October 16, 2008, the United States submitted its response.
On October 22, 2008, Jessica Gonzales, her counsel, and an expert on
police practices argued the merits of her case before the Commission. We
focused on the facts of June 22 and 23, 1999, the failure of the police to
respond adequately to Jessica Gonzales's pleas for help, and the lack of a
thorough investigation into the deaths of her three children. We argued that
the government failed to meet its affirmative obligation to exercise due
diligence to protect Jessica Gonzales and her children from this vicious act
of violence. Professor Jeffrey Fagan testified about best practices for police
response to domestic violence. And Jessica Gonzales again had an.
opportunity to testify at length to the commissioners about the ways in
which the government had violated her human rights by failing to arrest
Simon Gonzales, failing to conduct a thorough investigation, and failing to
provide her with a remedy. The U.S. government again sent a high level
delegation including Andrew Stevenson, Representative to the OAS for the
U.S. Department of State; Eric Zimmer, counsel for the Town of Castle
Rock; Baumer, from the Office of the Legal Advisor for the Department of
104. Id. at 13-20.
105. Id. at 20-22.
106. Id. at 22-25.
107. See Gonzales v. United States, Case 12.626, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report No. 52/07,
OEA/Ser/L/V/I1.128, doc. 19 (2007), available at http://www.aclu.org/images/asset-
uploadfile431_32105.pdf (although the decision is dated July 24, 2007, it was not
transmitted to the parties until October 3, 2007).
108. Id. 37-40.
109. Id. 46-50.
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State, and Kaplan, from the Department of Justice, who were present at the
March 2007 hearing; and several other representatives from the U.S.
Department of State and the U.S. Department of Justice. The hearing lasted
an hour and a half. The room was standing-room only, packed with
overflow crowds of supporters for Jessica Gonzales, and the hearing was
broadcasted live on the Internet for many more people to watch. Following
the hearing, the parties were given an opportunity to submit posthearing
observations. We expect the Commission to issue its findings and
recommendations in early 2009.
III. THE IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL MECHANISMS ON U.S. DOMESTIC
POLICY
The advocacy in which we have engaged on behalf of Jessica Gonzales
illustrates the range of international human rights mechanisms that can be
employed to influence U.S. policy to end violence against women.
Mechanisms exist at the universal level, such as the United Nations special
rapporteurs and treaty-monitoring committees, as well as at the regional
level, including the IACHR. By engaging these various mechanisms,
advocates are able to shine a spotlight on the widespread problems of
violence against women and police lack of accountability for preventing
such violence. Further, as international bodies issue observations,
recommendations, and reports on U.S. abuses and violations of
international law in the Gonzales case specifically and with regard to the
problem of domestic violence and police lack of accountability more
generally, as did the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women in her
report to the Human Rights Council 110 and the CERD Committee in its
concluding observations, 1 1 and as we anticipate the IACHR will do at the
conclusion of the petition proceedings before it, it will become more and
more difficult for the United States to continue to keep its head in the sand
and disavow any governmental responsibility for protecting women from
intimate violence.
However, these reports, observations, and recommendations, alone, will
not force the United States to change its policies. Rather, advocates must
use the international human rights mechanisms and the resulting
observations and recommendations to push the United States to alter its
policies. To do so, advocates must first publicize those proceedings,
observations, and recommendations to make the public aware of the
mechanisms and their operation as well as the substantive abuses that are at
issue in the proceedings before these bodies. Furthermore, advocates must
cite as persuasive (though not controlling) authority the concluding
observations in other legal proceedings-both in domestic courts and before
international bodies-and must use the recommendations as support for
policy changes at the state and federal legislative and executive levels.
110. See Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 36.
111. See CERD Concluding Observations, supra note 76.
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Thus, for example, we hope to use a strong decision from the IACHR to
press for changes in the policies and practices of the Castle Rock Police
Department and in police departments throughout Colorado and the United
States, for changes in state sovereign immunity laws, for changes in states'
domestic violence and mandatory arrest laws, for enhanced funding and
training to support greater services for survivors of domestic violence, and
for changes in courts' understanding of human rights obligations on the part
of federal, state, and local governments. These changes will not come
easily or quickly, especially given the United States government's often-
espoused disdain for international human rights mechanisms, including the
United Nations, notwithstanding the fact that the United States was
instrumental in helping to create this system. 11 2 Despite these obstacles,
advocates must engage in this struggle as it is the most promising avenue
available at this moment in history to bring about meaningful policy
changes with regard to violence against women and many other human
rights abuses.
As pressure mounts from all sides, and from several separate
international human rights mechanisms, for the United States to reform its
policies so as to protect women from domestic and gender-based violence
and to ensure police accountability for such protections, it will be more
difficult for the United States to continue to turn a blind eye to violence
against women and to human rights violations more generally. Over time, I
am confident that we will see a change in U.S. policy to end violence
against women. Although advocates will face many bumps in the road and
will have to overcome steep hurdles, in the end, advocates' use of
international human rights mechanisms has the potential to play a
significant role in influencing U.S. policy to end violence against women.
Only then will justice prevail for Jessica Gonzales and for all victims of
gender-based, intimate-partner violence.
112. See supra Part II.A.1.
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